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Plane Answers: NTSB glosses over fatigue in the Colgan crash
As a pilot, I feel the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has failed me. They're tasked to investigate accidents and report on them so the aviation community can hopefully avoid similar mistakes. They also submit recommendations to the FAA for changes they feel will make air travel safer. But I have to question the impartiality of the NTSB after seeing the outcome of the Colgan 3407 investigation.
Yesterday the NTSB came out with a report on the Colgan 3407 accident in Buffalo, New York last year that puts the blame squarely on the captain.
CAPTAIN'S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS.
Clearly, the captain reacted to a reduction in airspeed in a way that is contrary to everything we're taught as pilots. But what caused this?
The NTSB sought to find out just why this reasonably experienced captain would respond in such a manner. Training records were examined, toxicology reports were submitted and everything that was said by the crew during the flight was analyzed.
Glossed over in the report was the fact that both the captain and first officer had very little sleep over the previous 24 hours. The NTSB says the captain had 'reduced sleep opportunities' and attempted to rest in the company crew lounge. Apparently the attempts at sleeping there weren't effective since the captain logged on to a company computer at 3:10 in the morning.
The first officer likely had a full day near her home in Seattle before commuting on an 'all-nighter' to her base in Newark. She also tried to get a nap in at the crew lounge in the morning as well.
But one of the investigators in the Colgan accident, Robert Sumwalt refuses to allow for the possibility that fatigue was even a contributing factor in the accident, saying "...just because the crew was fatigued, that doesn't mean it was a factor in their performance."
Incredible.
Numerous studies have concluded that significant sleep deprivation is equivalent to operating while under the influence of alcohol. The British Medical Journal concluded that "after 17–19 hours without sleep, performance on some tests was equivalent or worse than that at a BAC of 0.05%. Response speeds were up to 50% slower for some tests and accuracy measures were significantly poorer than at this level of alcohol. After longer periods without sleep, (up to 28 hours) performance reached levels equivalent to the maximum alcohol dose given to subjects (BAC of 0.10%)."
It's illegal to drive a car in the U.S. with a blood alcohol content at or above 0.08 to 0.10%.
The role of fatigue was mentioned during an NTSB hearing on the Colgan accident. Board chairman Deborah Hersman argued that several issues, including the crew's sleep deficits and the time of day the accident took place, were factors and said that fatigue was present and should be counted as a contributing factor to the crew's performance.
But the view of board member and former USAirways pilot Robert Sumwalt prevailed. He concluded that fatigue wasn't a factor in the accident. It didn't stop them from detailing the role it played in Colgan 3407 (PDF LINK)
So if nicotine is found to cause some cancer, but its role in a person's life expectancy cannot be determined, should we rule it out as a possible factor in a lung cancer death?
The British Medical Journal study concluded that fatigue does affect performance, finding that, "getting less than 6 hours a night can affect coordination, reaction time and judgment" and poses "a very serious risk" to drivers.
It was precisely this reaction time and judgment that are to blame in the Colgan accident. I'm sure if you had asked Captain Renslow about the proper response in a stall, he would have been able to recite the steps verbatim. But that night, he was operating in a fog caused by a lack of quality sleep for the past 36 hours.
And the copilot, Rebecca Shaw, after commuting across the country all night before starting her day, misinterpreted the stall for possible icing conditions that she thought was affecting the tail and so she retracted the flaps during the recovery, exacerbating an already difficult recovery.
Most pilots expected sleep deprivation to play the leading role in the Colgan 3407 accident. The industry has averaged nearly an accident a year for the past twenty years with fatigue listed as a contributing factor. Could this have been the first case where a lack of sleep was actually considered the cause of a crash?
If a lack of sleep can affect affect coordination, reaction time and judgment, how conclusive does fatigue have to be, to be considered a cause in an accident that lists improper reactions and judgement as the main factors?
This time the NTSB isn't even attaching fatigue as a 'contributing factor' in the Colgan accident, even though they went on to say in the report:
All pilots, including those who commute to their home base of operations, have a personal responsibility to wisely manage their off-duty time and effectively use available rest periods so that they can arrive for work fit for duty; the accident pilots did not do so by using an inappropriate facility during their last rest period before the accident flight.
There is no doubt in my mind that, if a BAC of, say, .08% were discovered in the pilots' blood that the NTSB would list this as the cause of the accident and close the case.
I've always been a proponent of the NTSB. They look at human factor trends and educate us on ways to avoid them. As a fresh 20 year-old pilot, I even defended the local NTSB office in a KOMO4 TV news report when their numbers were reduced.
The NTSB has done as much as the FAA to ensure safe flying for the masses. I don't understand why they've been reluctant to properly address the role of fatigue in a number of accident reports.
Perhaps it's because airlines are terrified at the thought of reducing the 16-hour duty day further, which could lead to the recall of a few pilots at each company. Airlines point to a policy that allows a pilot to call in 'fatigued' if they don't feel rested. But we don't allow pilots to self diagnose when they're too drunk to fly-we simply have limits on how much time must pass before they can fly.
So the fatigue policy, while helpful, isn't the only way to ensure pilots are well rested on their next flight. Furthermore, Colgan unilaterally put new restrictions on the use of fatigue calls by its pilots.
But the FAA was confident enough that fatigue was a causal factor in the Colgan Dash 8 accident to start acting before the final NTSB report has been issued. They are working on new limits that will reduce the duty day for pilots, which includes both flight time and the time sitting around in airports between flights.
To appease the industry, the FAA may have to agree to a slight increase in flight time limits-the number of hours a pilot is allowed to be in the air in a day-currently 8 hours for a two-pilot crew-to secure improvements to the current 16 hour duty day for pilots.
I applaud the FAA's decision to take on this cause after their previous 1995 attempt failed. At least the FAA seems to recognize that, for most pilots, it's not the number of hours flown in a day, but it's the amount of time on duty, and during what time of day a pilot is on duty that affects our safety.
Because there's no way we'll solve the fatigue issue if we continue to deny it leads to accidents.
Do you have a question about something related to the pointy end of an airplane? Ask Kent and maybe he'll use it for the next Plane Answer's Plane Answers. Check out his other blog, Cockpit Chronicles and travel along with him at work. Twitter @veryjr
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Reader Comments (Page 1 of 4)
Ri Feb 4th 2010 3:58PM
And how about flying with a head cold so severe that a lower altitude was requested? Flying with a bad cold was frowned upon in the AF (at least in my day (a long time ago)).
TLB Feb 7th 2010 11:12PM
Heaven forbid you call in sick. That leads to an investigation and possible suspension.
Simzee Feb 8th 2010 3:34AM
TLB In the casino', you get fired for calling out sick.
Jay Brooks Feb 8th 2010 5:33AM
Both pilots were trying to sleep in a crew lounge.Impossible. Undoubtly, they didn't want to spend the money to get a motel room for a short time. I recall being a copilot on a DC-10 and the Captain was a long distance commuter. We flew a red eye from MSP-LAX. He flew out and made no secret of the fact that I was going to fly back and he was going to sleep. He made a nest out of pillows & blankets and slept the whole way. Before I could contact professional standards the lead Flight Attendant turned him in to the Chief Pilot.
zf Feb 4th 2010 5:09PM
Excellent post Kent! I completely agree, the NTSB has really let the traveling public down. I agree with everything you say except for this statement.
"To appease the industry, the FAA may have to agree to a slight increase in flight time limits-the number of hours a pilot is allowed to be in the air in a day-currently 8 hours for a two-pilot crew-to secure improvements to the current 16 hour duty day for pilots".
There should be no "appeasing" the industry, the 8 hour rule is reasonable and should not be "traded" or "negotiated" away to shorten the duty day. Safety for the traveling public is the priority not the Airline industries wishes and desires.
Other than that, I agree with you. Excellent commentary!
ZF
Kent Wien Feb 4th 2010 8:32PM
Thanks ZF,
I'm not saying I completely agree with increasing the 8 hour max flight time in a day, but the FAA is on record saying that they're looking into bumping that number up while lowering the duty day.
And I should mention that as nervous as airlines are about changes to the rules, some pilots are also wary of restrictions on commuting. The FAA is in a tough place on this issue.
Gene Feb 7th 2010 11:49PM
Pilots fly less then 80 hours per month. If you reduce that to 40 hours per month the problem will still remain. They have a duty to get some rest before they come to work. I work 40 hours per week and I am expected to show up for work rested or not show up for work.
Jim Barker Feb 8th 2010 10:21AM
I'm a retired U.A. mechanic and this may be just the tip of the NTSB iceberg.
A lot of us (mechanics) and retired pilots as well, have wondered about the eventual ruling outcome of Sully's Hudson River landing. So far, there has been no media or NTSB mention of possible computer engine shutdown on his plane due to loss of Inlet pressure and inlet temperature, sensors at the instant of the bird strike.
If the computer sees no airflow past the engine inlet sensors isn't it possible the result of such a loss might be for the CDC to automatically cut off fuel supply and ignition as well?
Maybe the original FAA certification of these systems, as designed, needs to be addressed?........JB
Bryan Feb 4th 2010 8:26PM
You covered it all, Kent. Very thorough.
tm Feb 4th 2010 8:29PM
"It was precisely this reaction time and judgment that are to blame in the Colgan accident. I'm sure if you had asked Captain Renslow about the proper response in a stall, he would have been able to recite the steps verbatim."
On the first point, his reaction was to pull on the controls within a second of the stick shaker going off. I think it would be reasonable to argue, however, that fatigue likely played a role in the crew's lack of awareness and not scanning the instruments. The violation of sterile cockpit could've been a way for Renslow to stay awake, or he was just manic from lack of good sleep. But on the second point, I'm not too sure. Remember that he not only pulled on the stick, but increased the throttles (and the FO raised the flaps). Could it be they were confused by the NASA video Colgan showed them that detailed tailplane stall? However, again, you can say that what the NTSB characterized as a reaction of "startle and confusion" could be again a result of fatigue: of being out of it until the dreaded stick shaker came to life. Maybe you can be completely sure that Captain Renslow would be able to demonstrate proper response, but given the skimpy training he got at Colgan and his unfortunate history, I couldn't be so sure.
Unfortunately for the late Captain Renslow, his past not only came back during this investigation, but overshadowed fatigue. Interestingly, there are parallels to other regional carrier crashes, and many of those reports highlight "unprofessional behavior" in the cockpit (a few even cite fatigue as a contributing factor). Perhaps that can be used as a clear sign that a pilot is in dire need of rest.
tm Feb 5th 2010 12:29AM
"I don't understand why they've been reluctant to properly address the role of fatigue in a number of accident reports."
Given their history, and their general antagonism with the FAA and the airlines, I doubt they're concerned with pushback from those folks.
But this disjointed report, where fatigue isn't listed as a contributing factor, but clearly is noted in the report, represents where the NTSB finds the science of sleep and may be too conservative (esp in board member Sumwalt) in how it factors in the effects of fatigue. He noted a number of benchmarks from a study conducted for the NTSB, and noted that only one benchmark was met. Maybe he's misinterpreting the study (although no staffer corrected him if he did), but it appears that the NTSB is being particularly conservative in this area. Is it because not enough studies have been done? Science is slow, one study is generally not considered definitive and needs to be followed up with similar studies to ensure what one study shows is consistent. The media likes to tout breakthroughs all the time, but it takes years for initial results to be validate. A lot of the time, those breakthroughs couldn't be reproduced.
However, even if we can't fully understand the science of sleep, it would be prudent to have better sleep policies for pilots. Because even without further studies, we all know that better rest is how pilots can effectively keep fatigue at bay.
Ryan Feb 5th 2010 10:07AM
Kent,
Do you still have that coat?
Scott Feb 7th 2010 10:19AM
This accident appeared to have a number of contributing factors (like many accidents), any one of which would have led to an uneventful (for the passengers) landing: poor skill of pilot (didn't think anybody remembered his failed check flights! Is failing check flight normal for airline pilots?), icing, fatigue, no inflight deicing equipment (is it possible that 15 years later, after the Pittsburgh crash caused by icing, and the Indiana crash caused by icing, we are STILL talking about this? holy cow!), slowness of the FAA to mandate in flight deicing, perhaps even poor crew management--perhaps if the co pilot had been more forceful, the accident never happens.
Denny Feb 8th 2010 12:54PM
It's not uncommon that a pilot would fail a checkride at some point in his/her past. The system in place for testing is pretty strict, with remedial training and instructor sign off required before a retest is allowed.
BTW, I've heard approx. 1/2 of the applicants fail the Flight Instructor practical the first time... but that doesn't mean that 1/2 of the flight instructors shouldn't be instructing...
Jim Feb 6th 2010 11:32PM
Absolutely fatigue is a factor. I am an air traffic controller, and I can a testify that fatigue affects us as well. It is unconscionable to flatly rule it out as a contributing factor.
nightmanx1 Feb 7th 2010 6:23AM
I have been working on aircraft for about 15 years or so. I hear all the flight crews whine when they are tired, then you hear that they were up all night on the computer. I think it is funny that the FAA puts limits on the flight crew but not the people working on the aircraft. There have been many days and nights that I have put in 30 hour work days. Like working a normal 10 hour shift then driving 7 hours to work on a plane that is broke. Work 8 hours to get it up and going then drive 7 hours back just to work my 10 hour shift. All of this for less that 20 bucks an hour.
sam Feb 8th 2010 12:05AM
cry me a river. $20 bucks an hour indeed. why dont they just make em log hours like truckers. 11 hours driving, 16 hours on duty period. accumulate 34 hours on duty straight, then off for 48 hours. works for us.
JetMech Feb 8th 2010 3:37AM
" All of this for less that 20 bucks an hour."
That says it all. You voluntarily work for less than $20 bucks per hour in admittedly awful conditions. You have nobody to blame for that but yourself. Same with the Colgan Air commuter pilots. By the way, you are dragging the rest of us down with you when you devalue yourself that way. You're dragging down the entire aircraft mechanic trade.
Bob Feb 8th 2010 6:45AM
I could not agree with you more. I worked for McDonnell Douglas and Boeing where they would work you 10+ hours/7 days a week putting together new aircraft with some days lasting 15+ hours if the plane was behind and add the 2+ hours to commute in the LAX area each way, it does not leave much sleep time, unless you skip eating for extra sleep.
Scott b Kaley Feb 7th 2010 6:24PM
Aviation is inherently unforgiving... it doesn't matter if you are a physician or if your last name is Kennedy or how much or little wealth you have accrued. The fact remains that the crew of this aircraft crashed a perfectly airworthy airplane certfied and capable of continued flight. The airplane did not crash itself. The notion of a "reasonably experience" Captain is utter hogwash. The anecdotal evidence that the crew was actually quite terrified of the hazardous conditions they encountered is indicated by CVR comments and overuse of the autopilot during the approach phase in icing conditions contrary to the Q400 POH and company policy, which recommends hand flying the airplane in icing conditions. Good, old fashioned stick skills. Moreover, the inexperienced FO, by her own admission, had never seen hard IFR in icing conditions according to the CVR. The outcome is tragic and completely unacceptable. Unfortunately,the buck stops with the Captain's seat, even with any credible extenuating circumstances. At the end of the day, there is never any excuse worthy of the aftermath and human tragedy that follows an event like this accident. As a career veteran aviator myself, it a tough nut to swallow, but, nonetheless, it is still ours to stomach.